I923 German hyperinflation, in response to which the Dawes Loan was offered, is widely interpreted in terms of a conflict between industrialists who demanded reductions in real wages and increases in hours of work to finance reparations payments, and workers who pressed for wealth taxation to raise the requisite funds.3 Other post-World War I European inflations in response to which stabilisation loans were extended are similarly interpreted in distributional terms.4 Delayed stabilisation in France and Italy after World War II has been attributed to distributional conflict between capital and labour, and US aid has been assigned a role in bringing about stabilisation.5 Distributional conflict figures prominently in Latin American inflations where the IMF has extended stabilisation loans.6 And the distributional interpretation of inflation in Russia and other post-Soviet republics has been encouraged by evidence of income inequality and tax avoidance.
Our innovation is to introduce foreign aid into the Alesina-Drazen model. The critical assumption is that aid is not extended instantaneously upon the advent of inflationary pressures. Whether to provide financial assistance to a foreign country is a contentious issue. The existence of an inflation problem must first be identified. The case for aid must be made. A coalition supporting its extensions must be formed. Finally, a mechanism for transferring the aid must be created. Each of these steps is a source of delay. In the case of postWorld War I Germany, the Dawes Loan was only extended in I924, after some five years of inflation. General George Marshall's speech at Harvard University in June I947, making the case for US aid to Europe, followed an extended debate within the US government and preceded by six months' Congressional debate of the proposal. The merits of Western aid to Russia were discussed for more than a year before the G-7 countries assembled a $24 billion package in I 992.
The effects of aid in our model turn out to hinge precisely on the issue of timing. We find that aid announced early and dispensed rapidly can hasten stabilisation, while aid offered late has the opposite effect. When stabilisation is delayed because information is incomplete and each group hopes to outlast its rivals, the effect of aid will depend on whether it accelerates or delays the release of information. The knowledge that aid will be forthcoming accelerates the transmission of information in the initial stages of the game, but hinders such transmission in the later stages.
This result obtains because aid reduces the fiscal burden on the group that concedes first and thus induces earlier concessions by groups that suffer greatly from inflation. If the transfer is announced early, these groups will not yet have (2) There are two consumers, both earning the same constant income y and paying an equal share of taxes in each period. Besides reducing consumers' disposable incomes, taxes cause distortions which result in utility losses. These losses are assumed to be proportional to the amount of taxes but different across consumers; they are captured by a parameter OS, which is private information.
In equilibrium, each player consumes his disposable income. Ignoring the 7 In Alesina and Drazen's model, government spending before stabilisation is financed either by distortionary taxation or by new bond issues, in fixed proportions. Total government spending is then the sum of primary government expenditure and interest costs. Although primary expenditure is assumed to be constant, the rising stock of bonds outstanding causes an increase over time in interest costs and thus in total spending. Allowing for bond financing has no important effect on the game and may create the misleading impression that an increasing burden is required to induce stabilisation. To make clear that this is not so, and to present the game in its simplest form, we assume that all government expenditure is financed by taxation. In Casella and Eichengreen (I994) we allow for bond financing. The results are unchanged. Oi lies between known extremes 0 and 0. Both players estimate the opponent's cost 0 according to the density function f(0) and cumulative probability distribution function F(0).
(3) At the date of stabilisation T, non-distortionary taxes become available and are raised so as to cover all fiscal expenditure. These taxes are divided unequally between players, with the player conceding first -the 'loser' -shouldering a larger tax burden forever. The tax shares of the 'loser' and the 'winner' are oc (larger than I /2) and (i -C), respectively.
Since taxes are non-distortionary, the only utility loss following stabilisation is that associated with the reduction in disposable income. Flow utilities at all times after stabilisation are:
where L denotes the 'loser', W the 'winner'; and discounted lifetime utilities evaluated at the date of stabilisation are:
where r is the constant interest rate. (4) In each period, each player can concede and bring about stabilisation by agreeing to pay higher taxes forever. Alternatively, he can wait, hoping that his opponent will concede but enduring distortionary taxes in the interim. The solution of the game is a function T(01) mapping the idiosyncratic cost of living in the destabilised economy Oi into an optimal time of concession T. In equilibrium, T is such that the marginal benefit of conceding at T instead of at T+ dt equals the marginal benefit of waiting:
where H( T, Oj) is the probability that the opponent concedes between T and T+ dt, given that he has not yet conceded, and is given by:
where the prime sign indicates the first derivative.8
H( T, O) g [T)] (FNI) -G[ T(O)](N)
But: The additional assumption 0 > oc-I/2 guarantees that all types 0 > 0 concede in finite time. As shown by (7), and as usual in wars of attrition, the optimal concession time T depends negatively on 0: the higher is the idiosyncratic cost from distortionary taxation, the earlier a player concedes.
Moreover, the player with the highest possible cost, 0, concedes immediately, since he knows that any other type will wait. Therefore:
The differential equation (7) together with the boundary condition (8) completely characterises the symmetrical equilibrium. If, for example, the distribution of 0 is uniform between 0 and 0, (7) and (8) 
II. STABILISATION AND FOREIGN AID
We now study the effect of a foreign transfer on the expected time of stabilisation. We model the transfer as accruing to the government, consistent with the historical episodes described in the introduction. Assume initially that foreign aid is unanticipated and arrives in the country at time v. The transfer is equal to a share (i -/) of the present discounted value of the path of government spending. We can think of it as reducing internal financing of It is simple to verify that conditions (7) and (8) remain unchanged: the optimal time of concession does not depend on the size of the budget and therefore is invariant to changes in fiscal policy. The assumption that the welfare costs of distortionary taxes are directly proportional to the tax bill implies that the level of public spending cancels out in equation (7): a cut in public spending has an identical effect on the marginal benefit of conceding and on the marginal benefit of waiting. Because in addition fiscal retrenchment does not affect the boundary condition, unanticipated foreign aid has no influence-on the timing of stabilisation. The conclusion depends on the assumed linearity of the utility function, as we discuss further in Section III.
In point of fact, foreign aid hardly occurs as an unexpected event. It is demanded repeatedly by the prospective recipient and is the subject of bargaining and debate. We therefore turn next to the case of anticipated aid.
Suppose that at time s it is announced that aid will arrive at time V.9 As before, aid will be used to reduce internal financing of public expenditure. If stabilisation has not taken place by time v, after the transfer has arrived the game continues along the path described by equation (7).
Consider the players' problem in the interval between s and v. Immediately following the announcement and before the transfer has arrived, the welfare loss from distortionary taxes and the one-period cost of conceding are unchanged, because the level of government spending to be financed remains the same. However, lifetime utilities after the stabilisation are affected by the knowledge that public spending will be reduced from v onward. o-(t) is always positive but smaller than i, is decreasing in t and equals f, when t equals v. The anticipation of the transfer has two effects. Incoming foreign aid will reduce future fiscal burdens and therefore it diminishes the marginal cost of 9 Throughout the paper, we assume that the disbursement of the transfer takes place at a given date with certainty. If the date of the transfer is uncertain, the analysis becomes more complex because estimates are updated with the passage of time. Note also that although in our analysis the transfer is certain to occur at date v, the receiving country is not allowed to borrow immediately against it. In the absence of this constraint, a future transfer would be identical to an immediate transfer of equal present discounted value. The historical experiences we have reviewed suggest that in reality countries are not able to borrow against future aid. Proposition A identifies a necessary condition and a sufficient condition for hastening stabilisation. The proposition is proved in the Appendix, but the intuition follows directly from our previous discussion. A transfer can change the expected time of stabilisation by changing the optimal path of concessions in the interval between announcement and delivery. Stabilisation will be hastened if, for any type conceding in the interval, the optimal time of concessions T is smaller than it would have been without the transfer. Thus, the slope of the function T(6) at the time of the announcement must be flatter than the slope of the original function. This is the necessary condition identified by the proposition. It is not sufficient to guarantee earlier stabilisation, however. For this we must ensure that the slope of the function is flatter over the entire interval, and that there are no discontinuities in the path. It is not difficult to show that both requirements are satisfied if the slope of the function T(O) is flatter than the slope of the original function at the time the transfer is delivered, the sufficient condition identified by the proposition.
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At this level of detail, it is difficult to make empirical guesses about the support of the parameter 0 and evaluate the likelihood that either necessary or sufficient condition will be satisfied. But if the positive implications of the model remain ambiguous, the normative implications are clear. Since both T(0) and T(0) are monotonic in 0, Proposition A can be rephrased as follows: PROPOSITION A'. If there is a delay between the time foreign aid is announced and the time it is disbursed, then there exist two dates s* and v* (s* < v*) such thatforeign aid 1 A second possible source of discontinuity is a change in the boundary condition at the time the transfer is announced, triggering a probability mass of concessions. Since the announcement is unexpected, there is no reason to exclude this possibility a priori. A change in the boundary condition can occur if new information about the opponent's type is revealed, or if a player's cost from staying in the game has changed sufficiently that he prefers to concede even with a positive probability of winning in the next instant. In our formulation, however, no new information about the opponent is revealed at the time of the announcement, and no player ever wants to abandon the game. Therefore this second source of discontinuity can be ruled out. 
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announced after s* will delay stabilisation, while aid disbursed before v* will hasten it. s* is the solution to: T(0*) = s*, and v* to: T(0*) = v, where 0*+ I/2 = 20C.
Proposition A' states that foreign aid can accelerate stabilisation but that proper timing is essential: aid announced or delivered too late is counterproductive.
The result is particularly simple because s* does not depend on the size of the transfer. Whatever its amount, the announcement that aid is coming must be made before a critical date that depends on the structure of the economy, as captured by the parameters r, c and the support of 0.12 Proper timing is essential not only in announcing aid but also in delivering it. A full characterisation of the critical delivery date v* is complex since, unlike s*, v* depends on the size of the transfer.13 Regardless of the size of the transfer, however, the longer is the interval between announcement and disbursal, the higher is the probability that aid will delay stabilisation. But shorter intervals accelerate stabilisation only up to a point; as the interval grows short, the length of time during which the effects of the expected transfer are felt is also reduced, and the impact on the timing of stabilisation tends to disappear.
Although the size of the transfer is not of primary importance, it is not irrelevant. A very small transfer (,8 close to i) implies that u(t) will be close to i, and therefore that the effect of the transfer will be very small, regardless of timing. Conversely, a large transfer accentuates the difference in the slope of the original path T(0) and the new path T* (0) that is followed between s and v. Two implications follow. First, the larger the transfer the higher the return from getting the timing right. If the announcement of aid comes late, the expected date of stabilisation is delayed longer the larger is the size of the transfer. If the timing of both announcement and disbursal is chosen correctly, the date of stabilisation is hastened more the larger is the transfer. Second, the larger the transfer, the shorter must be the interval between announcement and disbursal for stabilisation to be hastened. Suppose the transfer has been announced early enough, so that T* (0) is flatter than the original path at 0A. Then the critical moment when the marginal player is of type 0* is reached earlier, and from that moment onward T* (0) is steeper than the original function. The larger the transfer, the larger the difference in slopes at time s, and the earlier the moment when T* (0) becomes steeper than T(0). Therefore, the larger is the transfer, the shorter must be the interval between announcement and disbursal. Why is timing so important? As mentioned above, a transfer has two effects: it lowers the lifetime cost of conceding by reducing the fiscal burden on the loser; at the same time it increases the marginal benefit of postponing concession until the transfer arrives. The relative importance of the two effects depends on the welfare costs of distortionary taxation. If these costs are high, the first effect dominates: the reduction in the cost of conceding is sufficient to accelerate a settlement. If, on the other hand, the costs of distortionary taxation are low, it makes sense to hold out longer in order to approach the time when the cost of losing is reduced by the arrival of aid."4 When aid is announced and-disbursed early, high cost players could still be in the game. For them the first effect dominates: earlier concession is now optimal. If no concession is observed, each player can deduce immediately that his opponent is not a high-cost type. Thus the announcement of a transfer hastens the rate at which information about types is conveyed. Stabilisation will occur at an earlier date because the optimal time of concession is now earlier for all types: because T(O) is flatter than the original function, more types would find it optimal to concede before time v, and because potential concessions continue at the original rate after v, all remaining types would also concede earlier.
But if the announcement is late, both players have relatively low costs, and both now prefer to postpone concessions (equation (I5) is violated) . The optimal path of concessions is slowed, and with it the transmission of information. After the transfer has been delivered, potential concessions resume at the original rate, carrying over the delay until the conclusion of the game. Stabilisation is delayed.
To summarise, timing matters because an expected transfer creates different incentives for high and low cost players. As a result, the transfer affects the rate at which information is revealed, accelerating stabilisation if its timing is such as to accelerate release of information.
Notice an immediate implication: only a transfer that is decided and delivered with sufficient dispatch unambiguously increases welfare in the receiving country. Such a transfer reduces the fiscal burden of the stabilisation and shortens the time during which the economy suffers wasteful distortions. If instead aid is too late, the reduced sacrifice required by stabilisation must be weighted against the increased delay in bringing the stabilisation about, and thus the longer interval during which the distortions take their toll. where c is constant. Here the cost of distortionary taxation is positive only when the distortionary tax rises beyond a threshold that depends on 6i. A necessary condition for an unanticipated transfer to accelerate stabilisation is that its impact on the deficit is larger than its impact on welfare costs for the marginal player prepared to concede at the time the transfer takes place. Here, this condition amounts to Ov > c, where Ov characterises the marginal player at the time the transfer is effected: players with sufficiently high welfare costs must still be in the game when the transfer occurs. Again, for aid to be stabilising it must be disbursed early."6 If the transfer is anticipated, abandoning the assumption of linear utility would complicate the analysis because the game would not revert to the original path once aid has been received. Nevertheless, it is likely that the effects studied in this paper would carry over: the incentive to postpone concession until aid materialises would still be present, and with it the differential effect of aid on players of different types and thus the role of the transfer in facilitating or hampering the transmission of information.
Another limitation of the model is that it does not capture the impact of expected future government spending on current inflation. A reduction in government spending leads to a commensurate fall in distortionary taxation at the moment it occurs and has no effect before that time even if it is anticipated. But inflation should depend not only on current money supply but on the whole expected path of monetary injections. Fortunately, our key results are becomes more polarised. A little more can be said if we assume a specific distribution for 0. For example, if the distribution is uniform, equation (9) implies that s* must increase with a. The lack of a closed form solution for T(6) prevents us from adding anything on the link between ac and v*. 16 Notice that 9v > c implies a negative threshold for distortions; i.e. distortionary taxation is costly for type Ov even if it is very small, as long as it is positive. For all 0 >, 6, welfare costs have a discontinuity at T = o. The restriction 0 > c-To(3/2 -aC), implying that welfare costs are positive for all players already at time o, is sufficient to guarantee that the game is well-behaved. where the probability that the opponent is more patient, Prob T(O,) > T7 is conditional on his not having conceded by t, and where the discount rate r is large enough to guarantee that ui is falling in Oi for all t. The first term in (2") is the cost of current taxation; the second term is the welfare cost of the discounted stream of expected future distortionary taxes. How far into the future distortionary taxation is expected to continue depends on the expected date of stabilisation. With some probability, the opponent is more patient, and stabilisation will occur when player i concedes at time T7 (the first of the two terms in the braces). But with some probability, the opponent is less patient, and stabilisation will occur when he concedes at time T(O,) (the second of the two terms in the braces). Our results remain unchanged: at the margin each player considers the cost of postponing his concession by evaluating the welfare cost of staying in the game for another instant at time T. But at time T his expectation of future distortions is necessarily zero because the game is ending: only current distortion matters. The marginal condition is identical to the one derived earlier in the paper (assuming the problem is still well-behaved and the boundary condition is unchanged)."7 Finally, our formulation assumes that aid is unconditional. It is easy to see that effective conditionality leads to earlier stabilisation. Assume a credible promise to deliver aid as soon as stabilisation occurs. Then only fig must be financed internally in all periods following stabilisation. Equation (7) Because ,3 < i, the slope of the function is now smaller in absolute value. Because the boundary condition is unchanged, for all 0 the optimal concession time T is smaller.
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In reality, however, the effectiveness of conditionality is disputed, and the most accurate way of specifying it is unclear. After the first instalment of a transfer has been granted, both the donor countries and the international 17 The counterintuitive conclusion that expectations do not matter depends on the assumption that welfare costs are a function of individual expectations of future distortions which can then be manipulated by individual action (concession). Notice that these expectations, although rational, differ between the two players since each one knows his own idiosyncratic cost 0. An alternative specification would have the expectation of future distortions, which is the proxy for inflation, be formed by an outside observer. Expected future events would then appear in the marginal condition, but if an equilibrium strategy exists, the substance of our conclusion would not be modified. 
